Right now, we are remembering the 80th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge (the Wacht am Rhein), fought primarily in Belgium in the waning days of 1944. There are many lessons to be learned from that horror that we can and should apply to the world – political and military – of 2024.

The battle is mostly remembered as the last, desperate attempt on the part of Wehrmacht to prevent the western Allies from defeating Germany. An attempt that failed, for many reasons.

It is yet another example of the complete waste of men and material in grueling combat which we see in World War II, especially the European Theatre of Operations and the Western Front.

The American forces won the battle by the skin of their teeth, where just a short time earlier, the Americans and the British had lost the series of battles we call “A Bridge Too Far” by the skin of their teeth. Some of the reasons the Wehrmacht won one and lost the other are the same: first, trying to achieve an objective that was beyond the perceived and real ability of the forces committed. Secondly, the dogged determination of the defenders in holding their ground. At least some of the defenders. Thirdly, and perhaps the greatest reason? Politics: especially so-called democratically-elected leaders who wanted to achieve victory at all costs. (Note that even Adolf Hitler was “democratically-elected” in order to come to power, and still enjoyed the loyalty and support of a very large majority of Germans even in December 1944.)

Unlike the horrific battle in the Hurtgenwald just a few weeks before (and lasting almost three months!), the same tactical mistakes were not made by either side, and the butcher’s bill, though hideous, was much less in the Bulge. In the Hurtgen, with about 200,000 troops involved, the casualties were staggering: 24,000 dead and another 38,000 wounded. (about 1/3) By contrast, the Wacht am Rhein involved a maximum of 1.3 million troops on both sides, of which about 71,000 died and 120,000 were wounded. (only about 1/5.) The tremendous loss of men (and material, especially vehicles) greatly weakened the ability of the Reich to defend itself against the Russians in the East and the Americans, British Imperial, and French forces in the West.

What lessons? The primary cause of the near-success of the Wehrmacht was American intelligence failure: intelligence of all types, coupled with an attitude of superiority: the Amis were already occupying parts of Germany and their defeat was inevitable. This led to the stationing of inexperienced troops in the Ardennes, which Model and the other German commanders took full advantage of. But this was in turn the result of Americans failing to remember that just four short years earlier, the Wehrmacht had used an offensive through the Ardennes to outflank the Maginot Line and defeat the French (and Belgians and Brits) in days. Overconfidence and poor preparation of the battlefield were clear.

On the German side, they also failed to understand their opponents: they still saw American soldiers as generally poor warriors and far too dependent on machines, especially aircraft. And figured they would break like the French had, several years before. They were wrong. They also depended too much of figuring that they could resupply themselves, especially with fuel, from their enemies’ assets. And they greatly overestimated their ability to move and break out, splitting the Allied lines.

But Americans, particularly at Bastogne, did not all break and run – or surrender. Instead they fought, and stymied to offensive. It was not Patton’s famous pivot ninety degrees to the north that won, it was men who took a stand and lived up to their pledges, even at the risk of life and limb, that stopped the onslaught.

The same is true today: people who stand up for liberty, who are willing to pay the cost, face their enemies and the enemies of freedom.

And win.